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Many countries levy withholding taxes on  estimated 56 cents for every dollar of tax with-
interest payments on international bank loans  held at the source.  U.S. banks passed on close to
and ether debt instruments. These withholding  100 percent of their potential U.S. income tax
taxes can be credited against taxable income in  credits to developing countries by way of lower
the major creditor nations, such as the United  interest spreads during the go-go lending years
States and the United Kingdom.  of 1976-78.
International bank loan contracts conven-  The cost of bank credit to developing
tionally state the interest rate or spread above the  countries is made unstable, however, as loan
benchmark rate net of withholding taxes.  For a  spreads reflect the cyclical marginal value of tax
given net interest rate, an increase in the with-  credits to the commercial banks.  In particular,
holding tax rate increases the withholding taxes  tax credits were fully reflected in loans with
paid in the borrower country as well as creditable  maturities of four years or less, but only partially
in the creditor country.  So intemational bank  in longer-term loans.  The rationale appears to be
loans become more profitable to the banks the  that banks have doubts whethcr tax credits
higher the rate of withholding tax imposed by the  flowing from long-tenm loans will still be
borrower country.  allowed in the future. They may also doubt
whether they will have enough taxable incorne to
As banks compete for loans, one expects  actually realize the full tax savings offered by the
these institutions to offer low interest spreads to  tax credit.
countries that impose high withholding taxes.
Huizinga shows empirically that international  Huizinga concludes that tax treatment in tlhe
differences in withholding tax rates are indeed  creditor country of interest income from foreign
largely reflected in bank credit terms.  sources probably still has an important effect on
credit terms. In particular, limits on tax credits
Using a sample of 510 loans to 14 debtor  for foreign-interest withholding taxes, as effec-
nations originated bctween 1971 and 1981, he  tively introduced by the 1986 U.S. tax refonn,
finds that the developing countries have been  will probably lead to less favorable credit tenns.
able to reduce their interest expense by an
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Joe Bankman,  for helpful comments.1.  Introduction
Many countries  levy  withholding  taxes  on interest  payments  on
international  bank loans  and  other  debt instruments. These  withholding  taxes
can  be credited  against  taxable  income  in the  major  creditor  nations,  such  as
the  United  States  and the  United  Kingdom.  International  bank loan  contracts
conventionally  state  the  interest  rate  or spread  above  the  benchmark  rate net
of  withholding  taxes.  For  a given  net interest  rate,  an increase  in the
withholding  tax  rate increases  the  withholding  taxes  paid in the  borrower
country  as well as creditable  in the  creditor  country. Hence,  international
bank loans  become  more profitable  to the  banks the  higher the rate  of
withholding  tax  imposed  by the  borrower  country. As banks compete  for loans,
one  expects  these  institutions  to  offer low  interest  spreads  to countries
that  impose  high withholding  taxes. This  paper  shows  empirically  that
international  differences  in  withholding  tax  rates  indeed  to a large  extent
are reflected  in  bank credit  terms.
Using  a sample  of 510 loans  to 14 debtor  nations  originated  during  the
years 1971-1981,  we find  that the  developing  countries  have been able to
reduce  their  interest  expense  by an estimated  56 cents  for  every dollar  of
tax  withheld  at the  source. U.S.  banks  are shown  to have passed  on close to
100  per cent  of their  potential  U.S. income  tax  credits  to developing
countries  by way of lower  interest  spreads  during  the go-go  lending  years  of
1976  to 1978.  In particular,  tax  credits  are shown  to  be fully  reflected  in
loans  with maturities  of four  years  or less,  but only  partially  in longer
term  loans. The rationale  appears  to  be that  banks  have doubts  whether  tax
credits  flowing  from long  term loans  will still  be allowed  in the  future,  and
they  may  doubt  whether  thev  will have sufficient  taxable  income  to actuallv
1realize  the  full tax  savings  offered  by the tax  credit.
Bank  valuation  of potential  tax  credits  varies  with the  business  cycle,
as bank taxable  income  is very  cyclical. During  recessions  potential  tax
credits  are  not  valuable  to the  banks  as they  are not  very profitable.  and
thus  onie  expects  interest  spreads  not  to reflect  international  differences  Ln
withholding  tax  rates.  Indeed,  interest  spreads  are  shown to be invariant  to
withholding  tax  rates  after the  two  oil crises  during  the  years 1975-1976  and
again  during  1980-1981. At the  same time,  tax  credits  were in large  measure
reflected  in interest  spreads  around  1978,  as creditor  economies  recovered
after  the  first  oi.l  shock.  The  apparent  countercyclicality  of the  cost  of
bank credit  to developing  countries  has  proven  to be a destabilizing  factor
in the  flow  of funds  to developing  countries.
The academic  literature  has almost  completely  ignored  the impact  of
creditability  of withholding  taxes  on bank credit  terms.  Lindert [19891,  for
example,  computes  the  realized  return  on international  bank loans  to
developing  countries  as of 1986  without  taking  into  account  the  creditability
of interese  withholding  taxes,  thus  severely  underestimating  the  true returns
to these  loans. Frankel (1984,  1985],  however,  points  out the role  of the
interest  tax  credit  in  banks'  asset  allocation  choice,  and in the  pricing  of
loans.
The tax  credit  gives  countries  the  obvious  incentive  to  increase  the
withholding  tax  rate,  but this  does not  appear  to have  happened  on a large
scale.  In  a more subtle  way, governments  have attempted  to  borrow indirectly
through  private  banks  or enterprises  that  are  subject  to the  withholding  tax.
This enables  the  creditor  bank to obtain  the  creditor  country  tax  credit,  and
to lend  at a lower  net interest,  to the  benefit  of the  borrower  country.
2Frankel  [1985,  p. 5] points  out that  developing  countries,  and in particular
Brazil,  have reacted  by directly  or indirectly  offering  withholding  tax
rebates  to private  borrowers,  thus  ensuring  tax  credit  induceA  spread
discounts  while  minimizing  the impact  of the  withholding  tax  on domestic
borrowers. In response,  creditor  governments  have acted  to limit  the
creditability  of interest  withholding  taxes. The  United  Kingdom,  for
instance,  limited  the  creditability  of Brazil's  withholding  tax to 15 per
cent in  1982,  while  Brazil's  withholding  tax  rate  was 25 per cent.  The 15
per cent  limit  now applies  to all  countries. 1
The  U.S. has responded,  in the  Tax  Reform  Act of 1986,  by forcing  banks
to allocate  their  foreign  source  income  into  essentially  three  separate
baskets  and to  calculate  the  foreign  tax  credit  separately  for each  of  the
three  baskets. 2 The three  baskets  are (i)  financial  services  income,  (ii)
high  withholding  tax interest  income,  and (3)  dividend  income  paid  by non
controlled  foreign  corpo:  :tions. High  withholding  tax  interest  is  gross
Lnterest  taxed  at a withholding  tax  rate  of 5 per  cent or more.  Low
witnholding  tax interest  income,  which is the  remaining  interest  income,  is
included  in the  financial  services  income  basket.  Excess  tax credits  may  be
carried  forward  seven  years  or back two  years to reduce  taxes  on income  in
the  same  basket. The effect  of this legislation  has been to disallow  U.S.
banks  to use credit  for  high  withholding  taxes  to reduce  the  U.S. tax  on the
banks'  low  withholding  tax interest  income  and income  from financial
services.
Ironically,  the  1986  tax  reform  almost  coincided  with the launching  of
the  Baker  plan for  dealing  with third  world  debt in 1985.  The plan called
for continued  voluntary  bank lending  to the  developing  countries  at almost
3the  same time  that the  tax  incentives  for  such  lending  were reduced. A
lesson  for the  future  may  be that tax  incentives  for  capital  flows  to
developin"  countries  in  various  kinds  should  be in line  with or at least  not
undermine  stated  policy  objectives  regarding  these  flows.
The remainder  of this  paper is  organized  as follows. Section  2
describes  the  banks'  international  lending  decision  and derives  the
estimating  equation. Section  3  discusses  the  data and  presents  the  empirical
results. Section  4 concludes.
2.  The Determination  of Loan Spreads
Following  Feder  and  Just [1977],  several  authors  have investigated  to
what extent  country  risk factors  are  reflected  in the  spread  over Libor
charged  on international  loans.  Edwards  [1984]  shows  that the  spreads  of
loans  to developing  countries  during  the  period  1976-1980  are  positively
related  to the  country's  debt co  output  ratio. Ozler [1988]  shows that  LXC
loan  spreads  also reflect  payments  problems  in  earlier  periods. Ozler
[forthcoming]  arguss  that the  downward  trends  in spreads  during  the 1970's
are  consistent  with  gradual  learning  by the  commercial  banks  about  a
country's  creditworthiness.  This section  extends  the  empirical  framework  to
take  account  of the impact  of  withholding  taxes  on interest  spreads.
Credit  terms  in international  loan  contracts  can  be on a net  or a gross
basis.  Net loan  contracts  specify  the interest  payments  the  bank receives
net  of withholding  tax,  while  a gross  loan  contract  states  the  interest
payment  to the  creditor  subject  to the  withholding  tax.  Obviously,  with
gross  contracts,  the  net interest  payments  out of the  country  can be rather
risky,  as they  are subject  to unforeseen  changes  in the  withholding  tax.
4Until the  mid 1970's,  the  Internal  R'evenue  Service  did  not allow  a U.S. tax
credit  for foreign  tax  withheld  on net loans,  as it  was argued  that the
interest  tax  was  paid  by the  borrower  and  not  by the  U.S. bank.  Until then
U.S. banks  had an i-centive  to  write  gross loan  contracts,  even though  such
loan  carried  a risk  of  higher  future  withholding  taxes.  Starting  in the  mid
1970's,  however,  the  Internal  Revenue  Serv.ce  recognized  withholding  tax
credits  for  all international  loans  and the  incentive  to write  gross loans
disappeared. Overall  the  banking  convention  has  been to  write net
international  loan  contracts.
Let  i  be the  net interest  rate in  an international  loan  contract,  and
let  r  be the  rate  of withholding  tax  levied  by the  borrowing  country.  The
gross  interest  rate is then  i/(l-r),  and the  tax  withheld  per dollar  of debt
is  i7/(l-r). Withholding  tax  rates  on interest  typically  range from  0  to
30  per cent,  while  corporate  tax rates  in the  major  creditor  countries  are
at least  30 per  cent.  This suggests  that  banks  would  never  be in an excess
credit  position. 3 However,  this  is not the  case  as creditor  and  borrower
country  definitions  of income  typically  differ.  In  particular,  the
withholding  tax is imposed  on all interest  income,  while  the  creditor  country
taxes  interest  income  net of interest  expense  and maybe  some  other  bank
expenses. As an example,  let  r - 0.20,  i - 0.10,  and let the  bank's  cost of
funds,  denoted i*,  be 0.08.  The gross  interest  rate is 0.125 (from
0.10/(1.0  - 0.2)).  Per  dollar  lent,  the  tax  withheld  by the  borrowing
country  is  0.025 (from  (0.10*0.20/(1  - 0.20)).  Income  by creditor  country
definition  is  0.045  per dollar  lent. Hence,  the  effective  borrowing  country
tax - by creditor  countrv  definition  - is  56 (from  0.025/0.045)  per cent
rather  than  20 per cent.  This means  the  bank may  well be in  excess  credit
5position,  as 56  per cent  exceeds,  for instance,  the  U.S. corporate  tax  rate.
For  a bank in excess  credit,  let  Oi(r/l-r)  be the  actual  value  of the
Lax  credit  to the  bank measured  in  before  tax  income  per dollar  of debt.
Hence,  the  effective  gross  interest  rate  the  bank receives  is  i(l[  +  0(v/l.-
r)].  With  e  - l.,  the  bank  can take the  full tax  credit.  In this instance,
the  marginal  creditor  country  income  tax  is the  creditor  country  corporate
tax  rate.  This tax rate,  however,  does  not affect  the interest  rate  i  as
we assume  the  bank's  cost of funds  can be fully  expensed  against  creditor
country  taxable  income. With  P  <  1, the  bank cannot  take the full  credit
and the  bank is in an excess  credit  position. Now the  marginal  creditor
country  incom'  tax  is zero.
The  size of  A  increases  with the  creditor  country  tax rate,  if in fact
the  bank is in an excess  credit  position. This is the  case as for  a bank in
an excess  credit  position  the  U.S. tax liability  on foreign  source  income  is
a binding  constraint  on the  actual  tax  credit  taken. Hence,  an increase  in
the  U.S. tax  rate that  relaxes  this  constraint  increases  the share  of the
potential  tax  credit  that is actually  taken.  Similarly,  e  decreases  with
the  withholding  tax  rate.  However,  the  magnitude  of  8  in practice  does not
follow  just from the  tax  details  of a specific  loan.  Rather,  the  extent  to
which  the  potential  tax  credits  associated  with a certain  loan  can be used
cepends  on the  availability  of other  lower  withholding  tax  income  and other
bank income  for  which  creditor  country  taxes  can  be offset  by the  credit.  In
particular,  d  will  be larger  the  more profitable  a bank's  general  operations
in the foreign  source  from  which the  interest  originates. U.S. tax  changes
introduced  in 1986 that  compelled  banker  to calculate  tax  credits  for
separate  baskets  of income  effectively  reduced  .
6Unen setting  loan  spreads,  banks take  into  account  futurs  tax  credits  as
well as risk  factors  that  affect  the  probability  of loan  default. Let  p
stand  for  the  probability  of loan  default.  For  simplicity,  we assume  that in
case of default  the  bank is not repaid  at all.  Banks  are assumed  to be risk
neutral. Bank rivalry  ensures  that the  bank's  expected  return  - inclusive  of
the  tax  credit  - equals  the  bank's  cost  of funds.  Formally,  the loan
interest  rate is determined  such that
(1  - p)[1  +  i(l  +  I  - 1  +  i*  (1)
In the  empirical  section,  the  bank's  cost  of funds  will be taken  to  be
the  London  Interbank  Offer  Rate (LIBOR). The above  formulation  implies  full
loss  offset  of lost  principal  in  case the  country  defaults  and the  bank faces
a positive  marginal  creditor  country  corporate  tax  rate.  Relationship  (1)
may  not  simultaneously  hold for  all  banks in  all countries  or even the  same
country. Rather,  the  banks that  can  make the  most of the  credit,  and thus
have the  highest P, will make the  loan  and  determine  the interest  rate  i.4
The probability  of default  generally  is  assumed  to depend  on country  as
well as loan  characteristics.  Variables  that  have  been considered  good
indicators  of creditworthiness  include  the  country's  debt service  to exports
ratio,  and  debt to gnp ratio. Loan characteristics  that  may influence
default  are the  size  of the  loan  and loan  maturity. The probability  of
default  can also  be expected  to  be related  to the  bank's  required  rate  of
return  i*,  as it  affects  i  and as high interest  charges  make loan default
more likely. The probabilicy  of default  is  posited  to have the  following
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where xi  is  a  default  risk  factor  other  than  the  interest  rate i.
From  (1)  and  (2)  we  can  derive  the  following  expression




Thus S  is  the  contractual  interest  spread,  i - i*,  divided  by the
bank's  cost  of  funds i*. Linearizing  (3)  around r  - 0  and  1  - 1  yields
n
S  - aZi  r(4)
i-i
where
zi  (l-r)(1  +  i*)x,
The  equation  that  is  actually  estimated  is
n
s  - Cto  +  E  i Z,  - fr +  e  (5)
i-l
where a  is  a  constant  and e  if  is  a random  disturbance. 5
As  pointed  out,  not  all  tax  credits  can  be  used  if  the  banks  has
8insufficient  taxable  income.  The  above  basically  single  period  specification
abstracts  from  the  fact  that,  for  instance  in  the  United  Statrs,  banks  that
do not  have sufficient  current  taxable  income  are  allowed  to  carry credits
backwards  two  years,  and to carry  them forward  for  seven  years.  Under
current  rules,  banks  can  only carry  credits  forward  to reduce  future  taxes  on
income  in the  same  basket. Clearly,  postponing  taking  the  credits  reduces
their  present  value.  Also,  what is important  in this  regard  is the
availability  to  banks  of other  ways to  shelter  income. As pointed  out  by
Frankel  [1985],  banks  were allowed  to  deduct  interest  expenses  incurred  to
carry  tax-exempt  bonds  from taxable  income  during  the  period  under
consideration. Hence, foreign  tax  credits  may not  have been of immediate
importance  for the  U.S. banks.  In  a world  of income  and regulatory
uncertainty,  the  value  of tax  credits  and  hence  of the  parameter  6  is to
some  extent  determined  by their  option  value  rather  than  by their  immediate
usefulness.6
3.  The_  ata  and Empixical  Results
3.1  The Data
The data -,et  consists  of 510  loans  originated  during  the  period  1971-
1981,  from  the  World  Bank's  Debtor  Reporting  System. All loans  are to the
private  sector,  which  surely  pays the  withholding  tax,  are  denominated  in
U.S. dollars  and  specify  the interest  spread  above  LIBOR.  For  each loan  we
know the  month  of origination,  the  month  of maturity,  the loan  amount,  the
debtor  country,  and the  creditor  country.  Some  loans  are listed  as multiple
creditor  loans. On a loan  by loan  basis,  we collected  the  relevant  interest
withholding  tax  rates,  taking  note of bilateral  tax  treaties  between debtor
9and  credit  nations  (see  the  Appandix  for  data sources). Multiple  creditor
loans  are included  if the  debtor  country  imposes  a uniform  withholding  tax
rate  on all  outgoing  bank interest  payments.
Table  1 breaks  down the  loans  by year of origination,  and provides
information  on average  interest  spreads  and  withholding  taxes  for loans
originated  during  the  year.  Spread  is the  spread  above  LIBOR  written into
the  loan  contract,  while  the  variable S  is constructed  as this  contractual
spread  divided  by the  6-month  LIBOR  rate  during  the  month  of loan
origination. The LIBOR  rate  proxies  for  the  bank's  cost of funds  i*.  Note
that 166  of the loans  were contracted  in the  years 1977  and 1978  alone.  Note
also that the  average  withholding  tax  rate  has tended  to fall  over time.
This trend  is  not the  result  of tax  rate  reductions  in the  borrower
countries. Rather,  countries  with  high withholding  taxes,  such  as Brazil,
were  able to borrow  in the  early  1970's,  while  other  countries  had to wait
till  the  mid  and late 1970's  to gain access  to international  bank credit.
Also note the  countercyclical  pattern  in the  spread  and  S  variables:  they
are  low  before  and  rise after  both the 1973  and 1979  oil  crises.
Table  2 provides  summary  data on loans  for  each of the 14  borrower
countries  in the  data set.  Among  the  major  borrower  countries,  Korea and
Mexico,  with high  withholding  tax  rates,  generally  received  low  spreads.
Chile,  Costa  Rica and  Honduras,  with lower  than  average  tax rates,  contracted
higher  than  average  spreads. Brazil,  with a high  withholding  tax rate  of 25
per cent,  received  an average  spread  somewhat  above the  overall  sample  mean
of 1.51,  perhaps  reflecting  non-tax  risk factors.
Table 3  breaks  down the  set  of loans  by creditor  country.  The  major
creditors  are the  United  State  and the  United  Kingdom  with,  between the two,
10275 loans. The  United  Kingdom  overall  has provided  loans  with  a lower  than
average  spread  to countries  with higher  than  average  tax  rate.  U.S. banks
have provided  relatively  many loans  to low  tax  countries,  such  as Costa  Rica,
Chile,  and Honduras,  as shown  by a low  average  tax  of 13.38  for  U.S. loans,
below the  overall  sample  mean  of 17.98. To some  extent  this  may reflect  the
non-creditability  of with;.olding  takes  on net loans  till  the  mid 1970's.
Table  4 provided  summary  statistics  for the  spread  and tax  variables  and
the  creditworthiness  indicators  for the  whole  sample. The first  column
states  the  means  and standard  derivations  of the  xi  variables,  while the
second  column  gives  these  statistics  for  the  zi.  Average  debt to  GNP
ratios  for  all loans  are a  modest  0.22 during  this  period  of loan
contraction. The loan  amount,  in  billions  of U.S. dollars,  and loan  maturity
are the  only loan specific  variables. All other  variables  are country  risk
variables  at the time  of loan  origination. Specifically,  the  debt and debt
service  variable  are for  the  country  as a whole.  Note that in the  1970's  and
early  1980's,  average  debt service  to exports  already  stood  at a high 91 per
cent.  The table  does not reflect  that  during  the  period  average  maturities
substantially  lengthened,  as more and  more loans  were refinanced.
3.2  Empirical  Results
The results  of regressions  of equation  (4)  are reported  in  Table 5.  The
first  two  columns  include  all 510 loans. The coefficient  on the  Tax variable
shows  that  56 per cent  of creditor  country  tax  credits  are  reflected  in
international  credit  terms. All  controls,  apart  from the loan  amount,  are
strongly  significant. The ratio  of imports  to GNP enters  negatively,  which
suggests  that  a countrv's  openness  helps to  provide  better international
credit  terms. Oddly,  high inflation  countries  received  better  credit  terms
11than low inflation  countries. This  could  reflect  the  perceived  salutary
impact  of high seigniorage  tax  revenues  on the  national  budget. The debt
service  to exports  variable  enters  negatively,  and  may indicate  bankers'
throwing  good money  after  bad.  Ex post.  we know that  bankers  made some
unwise  credit  decisions,  and these  regressions  to some  extent  appear  to
confirm  this.  Columns  3  and  4 only  present  results  for the  sample  of loans
from  only  U.S. banks.  Fully  79 per  cent of tax  credits  are shown  to  have
been passed  on to the  debtor  nations  in the  form  of lower  spreads. Results
for the  sample  of U.K. loans,  in  columns  5 and  6, show a smaller  tax  effect
of 43 percent.
Overall,  the  results  indicate  credit  terms  significantly  reflect  tax
withholding  tax  rates. This tax  effect  is stronger  for  U.S. loans  than for
the  general  sample. This suggests  lenient  awarding  of tax  credits  in the
U.S.  has caused  international  interest  rates  spread  to fall to reflect  tax
credits  rather  than  vice  versa.
As pointed  out, there  was an important  regime  change  when the Internal
Revenue  Service  started  recognizing  the  creditability  of withholding  taxes
for  net loans  in the  mid 1970's. As a result,  the  U.S. relative  share  of the
international  loan  market  increased  in the late  seventies: in the  years
1976-1978  the  U.S. awarded  52 per  cent of its  loans  in the  data set,  while
other  countries  made only 38  per cent  of their  loans. Table 6 provided
estimates  of the  tax  effects  for  U.S. and non-U.S.  loans  for this  period  of
heavy  U.S. lending. The tax  effect  for  U.S. loans  for this  period  at -0.924
indicates  almost  a full  pass through  of tax  credits  to borrowers. During
this  period,  non-U.S.  lenders  were relatively  uncompetitive,  as they
discounted  only 61 per  cent of potential  tax  credits.  Regressions  for  the
12years 1979-1981,  also in the  table,  show that  the-  tax  effect  disappears  for
U.S. loans,  and is reduced  to around  21 per  cent for  non-U.S.  loans.  The
vanishing  tax  effect  for  U.S. loans  cannot  be due to a change  in the  tax law,
as at that  time there  had not  yet  been substantial  changes  in  U.S. tax
regulations. Of course,  the  effect  to some extent  may be due to rumblings  of
future  changes. More likely,  the  tax  effect  declined  in importance  because
(i)  banks  already  had accumulated  huge potential  tax  credits  and (ii)  in the
wake  of the  second  oil crisis  bank taxable  income  was declining.
To explore  the latter  explanation  further,  Table 7  reports  regression
results  for  different  time  periods  of loans  origination  for  all  creditors.
The four  periods  roughly  correspond  to the  periods  leading  up to and
following  the  oil crises  of 1973  and 1979.  The actual  years these  oil  crises
arose  were included  in the  pre-oil  crisis  periods,  as bank taxable  income  can
be assumed  to respond  with a lag  to a downturn  of the  economy. Regardless  of
the  exact  cut-off  points  of the  specific  periods,  what emerges  is the result
that  the tax  effect  on interest  rate  spreads  basically  disappeared  in the
years following  each  of the  two  oil crises. Apparently,  in those  years  banks
did  not value  the  prospect  of tax  credits,  as taxable  income  was sufficiently
sheltered  either  because  there  was no taxable  income  or because  other
sheltering  methods  were sufficient.
To support  this,  Table  8 provides  same data  on U.S. bank profitability
and taxes  for  the  years  1970-1985. In particular,  the table  provide  data on
gross income  as a percentage  of total  assets,  and  of U.S. tax  liability  as a
percentage  of gross income  for  all  banks  traded  on the  New York Stock
Exchange,  and  separately  for  the  top 10  U.S. banks.  The table  shows  that
both measures  were relatively  low  during  the  years  1973-1974  in the  wake of
13the first  oil  shock.  Profitability  and  taxes  then reached  highs  around 1978,
and  dropped  off  again in 1981.  In particular,  the  average  tax  rate for  the
top 10  banks  dropped  from 35.72  in 1980 to 29.86  in 1981.  Table 1  and 8
together  indicate  a negative  correlation  between  the  average  U.S. tax  rate
paid  by U.S.  banks  and the  net interest  charged  on loans  to  developing
countries.
The important  implication  is that  credit  supply  to the  developing
countries  is  highly  unstable. In times  of world recession,  cheap loans  to
developing  countries  tend  to dry up,  as banks  do not  need additional  tax
shelters. This scenario  of unstable  credit  supply  to  developing  countries,
which in  part caused  later  payments  difficulties,  has been described  in
detail  by Devlin [1989]. Devlin  argues  that the  unstable  credit  supply  is
due  to shortcomings  in risk  assessment  and  particular  characteristics  of the
banking  industry,  such  as the  relationship  between  lead  banks and
participating  banks in loan  syndicates,  rather  than  due to external
incentives  provided  to the  banking  industry  in the  form  of, for instance,
withholding  tax  credits.
By lending  internationally,  banks  obtain  the  option  to  use tax  credits
for  the  duration  of the  loan,  and for  some time  thereafter  as tax  credits in,
for  instance,  the  United  States  can  be carried  forward  for  seven  years.
Banks  can  be expected  to value  tax  credits  arising  from short  term loans
close  to  one for  one, as only  banks  that  will surely  use them  will obtain
them. Also, for  short  term  credits  there  is little  risk  of an unforeseen
changes  in tax  regulation. To test this,  we estimate  the  tax effect  for  sets
of loans  of different  maturities.
The results,  in  Table 9, show that  for  loans  with maturities  equal to or
14less  than  2 or 4  years the  hypothesis  that P  - 1  cannot  be rejected  at the
5 per  cent  significance  level. Generally,  the longer  loan  maturities,  the
smaller  the  tax  factor  in the  determination  of loan interest  spreads. For
loans  with a maturity  of 9 or more  years,  there  is no discernible  tax effect
at all.  These  results  indicate  that  to  maximize  its  tax  credit  related
discounts,  a country  should  obtain  short  term  credit  that are  continually
refinanced  with possibly  different  banks. However,  this  effect  should  be
balanced  against  the  strong  and  independent  negative  impact  of loan  maturity
on the  interest  rate  spread  that is  evident  in  Table 5, and is confirmed
throughout.
4.  Conclusions
This  paper  has shown  that tax  credits  available  to creditor  banks  for
withholding  taxes  paid in the  developing  country  to a large  extent  are
reflected  in lower  international  interest  rate  spreads. Variation  in the
value  of these  tax  credits  has contributed  to the  variability  of credit  terms
offered  to developing  countries  during  the  1970's  and  early 1980's.
Specifically,  the  avalanche  of credit  that  became  available  in the  years 1977
and 1978  appears  in important  part due  to (i)  a surge  in  bank taxable  income
in  need  of a tax shelter  and (ii)  a shift  in International  Revenue  Service
policy  which  allowed  the  creditability  of  withholding  taxes  for  net loans.
These  reasons  for the  credit  surge  are in addition  to the  standard
explanation  that  at the  time  the  banks  were awash  with deposits  from the  oil
exporting  countries.
In the  period  1980-1081,  international  interest  spreads  do not reflect
sizable  tax  credits. Apparently,  the  marginal  value  of obtaining  additional
15means  of sheltering  tax  income  was  very low for  the  banking industry  at that
time.  This  may  have contributed  to the  banks'  refusal  to simply  refinance
the  old  debt  at comparable  terms  in the  latter  part of 1982 that  set  off the
debt  crisis  of the  1980's. The  build-up  of debt  by that time  may  have made  a
debt  crisis  inevitable. However,  the low  value  of tax  credits  to the  banks
was one  of the  factors  that  caused  the  debt  crisis  to start in 1982,  in
addition  to a  restrictive  macro  policy  in the  U.S. that resulted  in  high
real interest  rates  and  a deep recession.
The  value  of tax  credits  of U.S.  banks  has  been substantial. In 1976
and 1978,  for instance,  the  respective  values  were $212.6  and $277.0
million. 8 These  tax  credits  have to be added to interest  payments  by the
country  to get  a fair  picture  of the true  return  of international  lending  to
U.S.  banks,  and they  make the  banks  appear  less short-sighted  than  they are
sometimes  made  out to be.  These tax  benefits  are in addition  to the
substantial  benefits  of deposit  insurance,  which  as argued  by Penati  and
Protopapadakis  (1988]  is  a major  subsidy  to international  lending. Ozler  and
Huizinga  (1989]  show that  the  benefits  of present  federal  deposit  insurance
are  reflected  in secondary  market  prices  of LDC debt.  Of course,  secondary
market  prices  of LDC  debt and  bank stock  price  should  also reflect  the
creditability  of withholding  taxes,  to the  extent  that the  borrowing  public
and  private  entities  are  subject  to these  taxes.9
The  creditability  of  withholding  taxes  should  have affected
international  interest  rates  during  the  1980's  and 1990's  as well, to the
extent  that  recent  regulations  allow  the  creditability. Of course,  interest
rates  on bank loans  to developing  countries  during  the 1980's  to a large
extent  are  the result  of reschedulings  of previously  contracted  debt.  Thus
16these  interest  rates  are the  outcome  of complex  bargaining  between  the  banks
and the  developing  countries,  with the  withholding  tax  creditability  as only
one  of the  determining  factors. The impact  of tax  regulations  on
rescheduling  agreements  have  at this  point  not  been explored.
17Appendix:  DescriRtion  of Data Sources.
The "Jorld  Bank's  Debtor  ReRorting  System  provides  the  following
inforaation  on a loan  by loan  basis:  debtor  country,  creditor  country,  month
of loan  origination,  month  of loan  maturity,  loan  amount,  and the interest
rate  spread. The selected  loans  are  to the  private  sector,  denominated  in
U.S.  dollars,  and specify  the  spread  above  LIBOR.  Some loans  with multiple
creditor  countries  are included  in the  sample  if the  debtor  country  imposes  a
uniform  interest  withholding  tax  on all  outgoing  bank interest  payments.
Information  on the  country's  debt outstanding,  and debt service  are
derived  from  the  Debtor  ReDoQting  System  as well.
Tax rates  are  compiled  from  the following  sources:
Comnorate  Taxes.  A Worldwide  Summary  (previously  called  CorDorate  Taxes
in  80 Countries),  Price  Waterhouse  (New  York),  various issues.
International  Tax Summaries,  Coopers  and  Lybrand  (Wiley,  New  York),
various  issues.
Country  information  and tax  treaty  information  from  the following
publications  of International  Bureau  of Fiscal  Documentation  in  Amsterdam:
African  Tax  Systems,  Looseleaf,  E. de Brauw-Hay  and F. Butzelaar-Mohr,
editors.
Taxation  in Latin  AmerLca, Looseleaf,  P.  Masson-Parodi,  editor.
Taxes  and  Investment  in_Latin  America,  Looseleaf,  J. van  Hoorn,  Jr.,
editor.
For  some  years,  tax  data  has  been interpolated  or extrapolated,  as tax
rate  information  is  not  available  for  all  years for  all  countries. However,
tax  rates,  and  especiallv  internationally  negotiated  tax  rates,  tend to  vary
little  from  year to year.
18All other  data is from  the IEC,  the  World  Bank.  Data for  Gross  Domestic
Product  is used instead  of data for  Gross  National  Product  if the latter  is
not availZble.
19References
Altshuler,  R. and  A. Auerbach,  The  Significance  of Tax Law  Asymmetries: An
Empirical  Investigation,  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics  105,  61-86,
1990.
The Banker's  Guide  to the  Tax  Reform  Act of 1986,  Peat,  Marwick,  Mitchell  &
Co., Bank  Administration  Institute,  Rolling  Meadows,  I1.  1989.
Devlin,  R.,  Debt  and Crisis  in Latin  America,  The Supply  Side of the  Story
(Princeton  University  Press),  1989.
Edwards,  S.,  LDC's  Foreign  Borrowing  and Default  Risk:  An Empirical
Investigation  1976-1980,  American  Economic  Review  74, 726-734,  1984.
Foreign  Tax Credits  for  Banks,  KPMG, 1987.
Feder,  G. and  R. Just,  A Study  of Credit  Terms in the Eurodollar  Market,
European  Economic  Review  9, 221-243,  1977.
Frankel,  A., Federal  Taxation  and the  Domestic-Foreign  Asset  Choice  of a
U.S. Bank,  International  Finance  Discussion  Paper  243, Board  of
Governors  of the Federal  Reserve,  April  1984.
Frankel,  A., Some  Implications  of the  President's  Tax Proposals  for  U.S.
Banks  with Claims  on Developing  Countries,  International  Finance
Discussion  Paper  263,  Board  of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve,
September  1985.
International  Revenue  Service  Statistics  of Income  1976-1979,  International
Income  and  Taxes,  Foreign  Income  Reported  on U.S.  Tax Returns,  U.S.
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington  D.C., 1982.
Internal  Revenue  Service  Statistics  of Income,  Compendium  of Studies  of
International  Income  and  Taxes,  U.S. Government  Printing  Office,
Washington  D.C.,  1985.
Lindert,  P.,  Response  to the  Debt  Crisis:  What is Different  About the
1980  s?, in  The International  Debt Crisis  in  Historical  Perspective
(MIT  Press),  B. Eichengreen  and P. Lindert,  eds.,  1989.
Ozler,  S.,  Evolution  of Commercial  Bank Lending  to Developing  Countries,
forthcoming  in  Journal  of Development  Economics.
Ozler,  S.,  Have  Commercial  Banks  Ignored  History?,  mimeo,  University  of
California  at Los  Angeles,  1988.
Ozler,  S. and  H. Huizinga,  The Secondary  Market  for  LDC Debt:  The Role of
Creditor  Country  Factors,  mimeo,  Stanford  University,  1990.
20Penati,  A. and Protopapadakis,  The Effects  of Deposit  Insurance  on Banks'
Portfolio  Choice  with an Application  to International  Overexposure,
Journal  of Monetary  Economics  21,  107-126,  1988.
Sachs,  J. and  H. Huizinga,  U.S. Commercial  Banks  and the  Developing  Country
Debt Crisis,  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  2, 555-606,  1987.
Withholding  Taxes  on Interest,  KPMG, 1988.
21Table 1.  Loans  by Year of Origination.
Year  Number  r*100  Spread  S
1971  6  16.67  2.33  0.32
1972  65  23.48  1.66  0.29
1973  28  23.56  1.26  0.14
1974  32  23.16  1.30  0.12
1975  30  17.67  1.66  0.22
1976  46  14.35  1.79  0.30
1977  87  16.06  1.93  0.31
1978  79  17.53  1.57  0.18
1979  50  13.04  0.92  0.08
1980  44  17.61  0.99  0.07
1981  43  17.26  1.38  0.08
Note:  Data  are  unweighted  averages. See  Table  4 for  variable
definitions,  and the  Appendix  for  data  sources.
22Table  2.  Loans  by Debtor  Country.
Debtor  Country  Number  r*100  Spread  S
Brazil  189  24.76  1.64  0.22
Chile  33  0.00  1.96  0.29
Costa  Rica  48  0.00  1.84  0.25
Cote  d'Ivoire  4  25.00  1.81  0.24
Cyprus  1  10.00  1.75  0.23
Dominican  Republic  9  18.00  1.58  0.20
Gabon  2  18.00  1.88  0.29
Honduras  24  5.00  1.66  0.14
Jamaica  3  15.33  1.50  0.22
Korea  168  20.55  1.20  0.15
Mexico  21  21.00  0.98  0.12
Paraguay  2  30.00  1.01  0.14
Portugal  4  15.00  1.00  0.10
Turkey  2  0.00  1.75  0.20
Note:  Data  are unweighted  averages. See  Table  4 for  variable  definitions,
and  the  Appendix  for  data sources.
23Table 3.  Loans  by Creditor  Country.
Creditor  Country  Number  r*100  Spread  S
Adela  7  0.00  1.75  0.28
Bahamas  52  19.96  1.52  0.19
Bahrain  1  25.00  2.50  0.33
Barbados  1  25.00  1.13  0.12
Belgium  6  24.33  1.71  0.26
Canada  20  16.75  1.55  0.21
Cayman  Islands  9  25.00  1.78  0.23
France  9  20.00  1.82  0.23
Germany  7  7.14  1.70  0.19
Hong  Kong  10  25.00  1.25  0.15
Japan  8  12.13  1.03  0.12
Liberia  1  25.00  1.50  0.09
Luxembourg  8  25.00  1.48  0.20
Netherlands  3  25.00  1.67  0.25
Netherlands  Antilles  1  25.00  0.00  0.00
Norway  7  5.00  2.41  0.40
Panama  21  10.24  1.88  0.24
Spain  8  25.00  1.48  0.20
Singapore  3  25.00  1.25  0.17
Sweden  1  25.00  2.00  0.41
Switzerland  13  15.38  1.48  0.21
United  Kingdom  147  20.49  1.41  0.19
United  States  128  13.38  1.58  0.20
Multiple  Lenders  11  15.55  1.45  0.11
Note:  Data are  unweighted  averages. See  Table  4 for  data definitions,  and
the  Appendix  for  data sources.







Inf  0.06  0.05
(0.05)  (0.05)
Invgnp  0.25  0.23
(0.06)  (0.06)
Debtgnp  0.22  0.20
(0.10)  (0.11)
Debtsexp  0.91  0.82
(0.55)  (0.50)
Resgnp  0.05  0.04
(0.02)  (0.02)
Resimp  1.17  1.01
(0.76)  (0.61)
Impgnp  0.06  0.05
(0.03)  (0.03)
Amount  0.010  0.01
(0.032)  (0.03)
Mat  6.33  5.62
(2.41)  (2.11)
Note:  Information  on the  mean and standard  deviation
in  parentheses  in  the two  columns  are for  xi  and  z,
respectively.
25Variable  Definitions:
Spread  - contractual  spread  over LIBOR
S  - ratio  of spread  and  monthly  6-month  LIBOR  rate  at
time  of loan  origination
- interest  withholding  tax  rate (as  a share)
Ini  - rate  of inflation  (quarterly)
Invgnp  - ratio  of investment  to  gnp (annual)
Debtgnp  - ratio  of external  debt to gnp (annual)
Debtsexp - ratio  of debt service  to  exports  (annual)
Resgnp  - ratio  of reserves  to gnp (annual)
Resimp  - ratio  of reserves  to imports  (annual)
Inpgnp  - ratio  of imports  to gnp (annual)
Amount  - loan  amount  in  billions  of  U.S. dollars
Mat  - loan  maturity  in years,  with parts  of a year counted
26Table 5.  Regression  Results  for  Al. Loans,  U.S. Loans  and  U.K. Loans.
All Creditors  United  States  United  Kingdom
C  0.758  0.760  0.799  0.791  0.776  0.752
(21.57)  (21.76)  (10.15)  (11.32)  (7.87)  (9.91)
-0.556  -0.559  -0.777  -0.785  -0.433  -0.406
(9.05)  (9.16)  (5.79)  (6.17)  (1.98)  (2.20)
Inf  -0.471  -0.467  0.163  -0.257
(4.59)  (4.58)  (0.85)  (0.89)
Invgnp  -0.560  -0.563  -0.003  -1.001  -0.981
(5.72)  (5.78)  (0.02)  (3.38)  (4.44)
Debtgnp  0.149  0.150  -0.065  -0.183
(2.12)  (2.14)  (0.53)  (0.58)
Debtsexp  -0.077  -0.079  -0.065  -0.065  -0.085  -0.117
(7.39)  (8.21)  (3.31)  (3.46)  (2.48)  (6.18)
Resgnp  0.897  0.891  1.800  1.513  0.877.  0.879
(3.16)  (3.14)  (3.28)  (3.00)  (1.66)  (1.79)
Resimp  -0.052  -0.051  -0.134  -0.122  -0.036  -0.024
(4.07)  (4.05)  (3.90)  (3.74)  (1.61)  (1.22)
Impgnp  -2.866  -2.864  -4.189  -4.157  -1.273  .1.516
(7.18)  (7.18)  (5.48)  (6.41)  (1.21)  (2.51)
Amount  -0.061  -0.528  -0.526  -0.121
(0.41)  (1.76)  (1.76)  (0.21)
Mat  -0.020  -0.020  -0.024  -0.023  -0.018  -0.019
(9.99)  (10.12)  (5.33)  (5.59)  (4.75)  (5.41)
R2  0.52  0.52  0.55  0.54  0.72  0.72
N  510  510  128  128  147  147
Note:  The dependent  variabie  is the  loan  spread  above  LIBOR  divided  by the
LIBOR  rate.  Parentheses  indicate  t-statistics. See  Table  4 for  variable
definitions.
27Table 6.  U.S. and Non-U.S. Loans After Change in U.S.
Tax Regulation
R R2  N
U.S. loans
1976-1978  -0.924  0.49  67
(3.65)
1979-1981  -0.115  0.67  31
(0.32)
Non-U.S. loans
1976-1978  -0.614  0.52  145
(5.05)
1979-1981  -0.208  0.45  106
(2.37)
Notes as for Table 5.
28Table  7.  The  Impact  of  the  Business  Cycle.
r  R2  N
Before  1975  -0.464  0.56  131
(2.72)
1975-1976  0.021  0.35  76
(0.11)
1977-1979  -0.633  0.67  216
(6.75)
1980-1981  -0.068  0.41  87
(0.51)
Notes  as  for  Table  5.
29Table  8. U.S.  Banks'  Income  and  Taxes.
Banks  traded  on  NYSE  Top  10  banks
x i  Gross  uncome  Taxes  Gross  Income  Taxgs
Assets  Gross  Income  Assets  Gross  Income
1970  0.97  33.27  0.88  34.57
1971  0.95  32.22  0.90  34.87
1972  0.82  30.70  0.77  33.05
1973  0.78  31.95  0.75  35.38
1974  0.73  31.60  0.73  35.66
1975  0.78  33.96  0.78  38.21
1976  0.76  33.50  0.74  37.32
1977  0.73  32.69  0.69  35.48
1978  0.82  34.50  0.79  37.82
1979  0.83  32.48  0.80  36.61
1980  0.81  30.80  0.79  35.72
1981  0.75  24.45  0.68  29.86
1982  0.70  22.57  0.68  28.82
1983  0.83  30.12  0.86  35.45
1984  0.69  33.94  0.76  30.79
1985  0.85  30.73  0.75  32.42
Date  Source:  Bank  Compustat.  All  numbers  are  percentages.  The  top
10  banks  are: Citicorp,  BankAmerica,  Chase  Manhattan,  Manufacturer's
Hanover,  J.P.  Morgan,  Chemical,  Security  Pacific,  First  Interstate,
Bankers  Trust,  and  First  Chicago.
30Table  9.  Loans  of  Different  Maturities.
Rz
Mat  s  2  -1.230  0.60  28
(3.13)
Mat  2  3  -0.536  0.50  482
(8.50)
Mat  s  4  -0.940  0.50  95
(5.33)
Mat 2 5  -0.499  0.53  415
(7.73)
Mat  S 6  -0.670  0.39  282
(6.77)
Mat  >  7  -0.326  0.43  228
(3.35)
Mat <  8  -0.605  0.52  430
(8.81)
Mat :  9  -0.085  0.31  80
(0.54)
Notes  as for  Table  5.
31Endnotes
1.  See  Foreign  Tax  Credits  for  Banks  (KPMG),  p. 171.
2.  See  The  Banker's  Guide  to the  Tax Reform  Act of 1986 (Peat,  Marwick,
Mitchell  & Co.),  p. 88.
3.  According  to  U.S. tax  regulations,  the  foreign  tax  credit  actually  taken
can  not  exceed  the  U.S. tax  on the foreign  source  income. Hence, if the
foreign  tax  paid exceeds  the  U.S. tax  due, then  the  bank  will be in an excess
credit  position.
4.  Equation  (1)  assumes  away  the  possibility  that  a bank can collect  rents
due.to  an informational  or other  advantage. The  extent  to  which  banks are
forced  to  pass on tax  credits  depends  on various  aspects  of the  banking
market  structure  that  are  beyond  the  scope  of this  study.
5.  For  8  - 1, (5)  exactly  corresponds  to (4). For  8  o  1, the
correspondence  is not  exact,  and  8  in (5)  approximates  the  P  in previous
equations. Below,  it is shown  that  for  various  regressions  the  hypothesis  of
8-  1  is not rejected.
6.  For  a discussion  of the  usefulness  of potential  tax credits  in reducing
future  tax rates  in a world  of uncertainty,  see  Altshuler  and Auerbach  [1990.,
p.76].
7.  Regressions  on U.S. loans  and  non-U.S.  loans  for the  period  before  1976
yield  tax  effects  of -0.821(3.61)  and -0.409(2.73)  with samples  of 30 and
131  loans. The  estimate  of the  U.S. tax  effect  prior to 1975  yields
1.371(2.19)  for a sample  of 22,  while  estimate  for  non-U.S.  loans  for the
same  period  is -0.403(2.31)  with 109 loans. These  results  suggest  a clean
regime  break in the  case of the  U.S.,  although  the  small  sample  size limits
the  meaning  of  both U.S. estimates.
8.  See Internal  Revenue  Service  Statistics  of Income  - 1976-1979,
International  Income  and  Taxes,  Foreign  Income  and Taxes  Reported  on U.S.
Income  Tax Reforms,  Table  2,  p. 97 and Internal  Revenue  Service  Statistics  of
Income,  Compendium  of Studies  of International  Income  and Taxes,  Table 1,  p.36.
9.  Sachs  and Huizinga  [19871  show that  bank stock  prices  reflect  third  world
debt  holdings  without  taking  into  account  differences  in  withholding  tax
rates.
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